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Abstract
There are many kinds of war. They span from typical military conflicts to socially and politically 
charged environments, from fiscal colonization to ghostly wars about information and the internet. 
But what about the fear of a possible war? Could housing initiatives be connected to that? What 
kind of design methods and standards as well as processes would that specific case entail? What 
other factors would add pressure to studying and implementing housing projects in this context? 
What could be the possible measure of such projects’ eventual assessment? 
This paper is based on the assumption that fear of a spreading of the Arab Spring in the Saudi 
Kingdom triggered a massive state-funded housing project. The ambitious case of Saudi Arabia’s 
Ministry of Housing (MoH) will be discussed and gradually unfolded within its social, cultural, 
economic, and technical-design conditions. The project’s development is discussed both before 
its launch-conceptualization and throughout its implementation. The original insight given stems 
from the authors’ participation as lead urban planners in one of the major companies awarded the 
project. 
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Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source 
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Introduction: State-Funded Housing Initiatives in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia (KSA)
Three decades ago, the urban expansion of Riyadh and other big cities in Saudi 
Arabia was fueled mainly by real estate land speculation. The urban sprawl 
and the non-contiguous and leapfrog development of the KSA cities were the 
direct result of massive urbanization creating an urgent demand for housing 
and commercial facilities.1 This was a strictly centralized political act defining 
the market’s control on housing development while denying the municipalities 
and their offshoot communities’ substantial powers and underestimating the 
looming financial, socio-political implications of the resulting urban sprawl.2 
As F.A. Mubarak (2004) states, “such outward growth, as in most other Saudi 
cities and towns, can be seen as suburbanization without suburbia.” 
In the mid-eighties, the government attempted to control the expansion of 
undeveloped sub-divided land and to slow down the urban growth via the 
Urban Growth Boundary Policy. Three urban development spatio-temporal 
“limits” (Phase I – 1995, Phase II – 2005, Phase III – beyond 2005) were intro-
duced for Riyadh as a growth management tool aiming mainly to: 
1. control urban sprawl by encouraging infill development where utilities were 
generally available; 
2. reduce the cost of infrastructure provision through better coordination 
tied to commonly agreed phasing; and
3. preserve the natural environment around the cities.
DOI: 10.14324/111.444.amps.2018v13i3.001
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The same decree extended the scope of the study to the hundred largest 
municipalities of the kingdom. 
Today, ten years after the “release” of Phase III, that bold initiative is 
deemed a success from many perspectives,3 though it did not avoid the forma-
tion of undeveloped areas (“white lands”) and failed to control housing prices 
in the metropolitan areas. The current MoH project, in most cases, focuses 
on the empty lands left as a by-product of Phase II and III in cities all over 
the country. Other initiatives addressing different scales, specific topics, and 
tools, and working in parallel to the MoH Housing project are the National 
Spatial Strategy, the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF), the Land 
Information System (LIS) and later conversion to GIS, and the Metropolitan 
Development Strategy ArRiyadh (MEDSTAR).
Hypothesis
This paper assumes that the ongoing (though currently threatened) MoH 
national project is a direct product of the underlying crisis in the KSA. 
By saying this, it is important to specify the use of the concept of ‘crisis’ 
for the purposes of this empirical research paper. As The Affordable 
Housing Institute and Ernst & Young state, “unless MENA’s public and 
private sector leaders change their strategies, the growing crisis of afford-
able housing will become a major long-term problem that leads to wide-
spread social dissatisfaction.”4 As also demonstrated in that study, the 
KSA may hardly be considered as an exception to that. The MENA region, 
Gulf countries, and the KSA especially are currently undergoing a criti-
cal transformation asking for urgent action. Their population is growing 
at two to three times the global average while their economies are shift-
ing towards a more services-based model. Housing shortages and rapid 
population growth, together with other severe social risks (unemployment, 
frantic urbanization, unclear processes of political representation and nego-
tiation, cultural ambiguity, and immigration) define the common ‘hot’ social 
ground on which the Arab Spring social unrest burst and the Saudi MoH 
project was conceived. In addition, the MoH project had to be developed 
in conjunction with the national spatial and housing development context, 
which inherited a set of severe challenges in terms of administrative, techni-
cal, and cultural obstacles colliding with the specific planning and design 
processes. 
As a whole, this massive project was, since its initiation, a critical testing 
ground for the whole of the Kingdom and its capacity to develop and imple-
ment its intentions. The MoH project entailed an uneasy combination of 
political urgency, on one side, and a set of applied design methods and insti-
tutional processes on the other. The latter preexisted the former. Thus, it 
could be easy to adhere to a strictly informative and descriptive technocratic 
address of the project without risking pointing towards its political context. 
Still, doing so would mean one failed to address two facts: First, bureaucratic 
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and technological processes are hardly neutral. On the contrary, they are the 
product and the tool of the political system they represent and attempt to 
reproduce. Second, many experts point to the imposing housing demand in 
the MENA region and, in particular, the Saudi Kingdom, while also suggest-
ing that “this shortage is one [at least] of the underlying causes of the Arab 
Spring.5 
Socio-Political Background
In the summer of 2015, following the recent decline in the price of crude oil 
and the large fiscal spending packages announced earlier that same year, the 
government budget deficit caused project layoffs across the Kingdom. Almost 
simultaneously, IMF announced that Saudi Arabia’s economy was teetering 
on the brink and might run out of financial assets within the following five 
years if it maintained its current policies.6 The government decided to freeze 
its funding on contracts in order to preserve liquidity, among them many pro-
jects related to urban planning, infrastructure, and housing.  It seems that the 
“Post-oil boom phase,”7 the current phase of urban development in the KSA, 
is gradually reaching its end.
According to the latest statistical releases,8 the population growth rate 
rose and remained high during the last five years at 2.55 percent (2014), 
while the number of non-Saudi nationals reached 33 percent of the total 
population. Over the last three decades, the population increased from 13 
million, 500 thousand in 1985 to 30 million in 2014; the official projections9 
add another 7 million by the year 2025. The greater metropolitan areas of 
Figure 1. Demographic projection for the MENA countries. 
Source: United Nations, 2004, World Population to 2100, taken from The Affordable 
Housing Institute and Ernst & Young, Understanding the crisis of affordable housing 
in MENA, 2013.
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Riyadh, Jeddah-Makkah-Taif, and Damman-Khobar are still receiving a 
huge number of domestic and international immigrants every year.
The Kingdom’s ruling class enjoys colossal wealth, but the country is also 
home to a large number of poor families, mainly in rural areas, and middle-
class unemployed young people who realize that they will not enjoy the com-
fortable life that their parents have led. The fact that almost two-thirds (67%) 
of the Saudi nationals are below 25 years old, coupled with unemployment 
that reached 11.7 percent among Saudis in 2014, reveals a shadowed future 
for a significant percentage of the population.
Despite efforts to curtail the pace of suburbanization of the metropolitan 
surroundings, and the initiatives/measurements aimed at holding housing 
prices down, big cities still suffer from the mass of “white lands,” while 60 
percent of Saudi families do not own their own homes.10 Rising rents have 
made it difficult for even middle-class people to afford housing. According to 
real estate experts, that is one of the underlying causes of the social unrest and 
the resulting political turmoil that spread across the MENA region during the 
Arab Spring of 2011. 
Under increasing pressure from the factors presented above, the authori-
ties have undertaken some ambitious initiatives during the last decade. 
Among them are projects related to education (Schools and University 
projects), employment (Saudization, feminization),11 transportation (Public 
Transportation Projects in Riyadh and Jeddah), and social housing (Ministry 
of Housing Project).
Ministry of Housing: The MoH Project
The foundation of the Ministry of Housing was an extremely promising 
and strategically chosen political act. In terms of semiotics and appear-
ances (highly valued within the given cultural context), the use of the word 
“housing” – isolated from any other adjacent terms (in full contrast to all 
other Saudi Ministries) – was intended as a straightforward message directly 
addressing the common feeling and the people’s fundamental concern for one 
of the hottest topics since the oil boom; namely, the ability of the state to meet 
the increasing housing demand in this rapidly urbanizing society.12 
The MoH would embody some scarcely allocated minor authorities and host 
other existing initiatives of the real estate sector. The MoH has been directly 
responsible for the management of residential property in the Kingdom. 
Furthermore, MoH would fully absorb the Real Estate Development Fund, 
immediately after the Fund’s authorization to increase the amount per home 
loan to be provided to beneficiaries from 300,000 SAR to 500,000 SAR. 
However, other key players would remain active, retaining intersecting areas 
of control. The Ministry of Municipalities and Rural Affairs (MoMRA) is 
one of them. That “divide and conquer” method, especially in the real estate 
sector, was highly criticized for holding responsibility for the control of the 
land values and the contrasting segregation of the urban areas.13
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To dissolve all shadows and capitalize on the momentum of its founding, 
MoH announced its first and main project at the first month of its existence: 
the design and construction of one hundred “cities” (or developments) con-
taining 500,000 houses country-wide! The initial budget was set at 250 billion 
SAR. Most of the project sites lie in undeveloped rural areas, with only a few 
planned on suburban plots near the major cities (Riyadh, Jeddah, Damman). 
The country was divided in five parts: North, South, East, West, and Riyadh. 
An international firm took over this last piece. The other four pieces were 
awarded to three consultancies (with the local one receiving two pieces: the 
north and the south one). 
Initially, the numbers sounded dazzling, and the respective strategies were 
highly aggressive. MoH would build entire cities, including the houses them-
selves. However, when the dust settled, the project proved to be extensively 
problematic. 
Administrative Setbacks
In a housing crisis, time can only inflate the situation as an auto-catalyst. 
Thus, despite the apparent urgency in announcing and approving schemes 
and projects, little was done in terms of administrative infrastructure. The 
bureaucratic issues that had to be tackled were underestimated. The need to 
satisfy the population’s increasing housing needs and quench any thoughts of 
discontent towards the ruling family had to come with unprecedented speed 
and reflexes. The consultancies awarded with the MoH project were able to 
launch studies and conduct their first stage of design work only two years 
after the Ministry’s founding.14 Jurisdiction problems were also apparent. 
The MoMRA already had some minor housing projects of its own, target-
ing the same objectives as the MoH. Furthermore, a set of standards set by 
MoMRA were used by MoH as the basis for its project. This set, however, 
was only covering several essential issues of influence and control (i.e., posi-
tioning of mosques), deriving from the Doxiadis plans for the Superblock 
neighborhoods of Riyadh.15
The socio-cultural singularities of Saudi Arabia were displayed in the 
process of the project’s plot allocations. This was a highly political process, 
in which several provinces – less dedicated to Riyadh’s standings – were 
provided top priority regarding the MoH project implementation in an 
effort to improve the popularity and influence of the royal family. The south-
ern mountainous provinces (i.e., Asir, Abha) were amongst the first to be 
included in the process. After having been approved by the central state, each 
municipality had to provide candidate plots for the design firm to evaluate. 
The review process and the final selection was more a political and social 
negotiation process rather than a technical one. In many occasions, visiting 
groups of engineers – accompanied by local officials – were prohibited to 
step on what seemed to be reclaimed as private family land, even under the 
threat of deadly weapons. In such cases, the subsequent negotiations between 
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the municipalities and the individuals would then last for many months and 
usually end up in land exchange arrangements. Institutional provisions and 
ministerial decrees have been seriously challenged in their authority by local 
communities and traditions when put on trial on the ground.
Technical Impediments
Obstacles of a more technical nature resulted in non-scientific and dubious 
site analysis studies. Digital information was elusive or simply non-existent, 
as many municipalities still work on hand-drawn maps and plans. This 
includes both spatial information and statistics. In some extreme cases, the 
exact boundary lines of plots were empirically described, resulting in clashes 
between adjacent property owners, local and central authorities, and the 
subcontracting topographers. Statistics were, in many cases, poorly prepared 
due to the lack of preparatory work by the MoH. Inevitably, all proposals 
were based on assumptions and lump sums. Other vital information was also 
missing. A logical decision to exclude residential uses from any “wadis” (dry 
riverbeds that flood rarely year-round, yet with catastrophic results) and to 
create buffer zones was not supported properly, since a cohesive national 
river/wadi digital registry was missing. Hydrologists had to work on some-
times highly elusive wadis in flat lands. And hydrology models would some-
times arrive even later than the master plan approvals, resulting in major 
losses in time, budget, and design efforts. 
In some special cases, the whole project sequence wouldn’t even reach the 
topographic survey and the overall site analysis. Access to sites allocated close 
to the border to Iraq (in the north) and to Yemen (in the south) was banned 
by the military for security reasons.
Figure 2. MoH Project site: Tathlith. An example of disregarding topography 
(hills and wadis).
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However, the most important impediment was the lack of national stand-
ards. As aforementioned, initially the standards of another ministry were 
applied. But they were only dealing with mosque positioning issues, underlin-
ing the importance of religious control over such parameters as walkability, 
clustering, land-use distribution, and implementation budget. In terms of 
architectural design, individual Western engineers from the assigned firms 
were the ones to import foreign typological and stylistic standards, such as the 
“Western-like” villa typology. In parallel, the introduction of the automobile 
as an element of the identity of the “modern” urban classes took advantage 
of the non-referential modernistic street grid.16 Non-customized design stand-
ards expanded even to the master plan’s presentation templates. Still, key 
elements such as strictly limited visibility to the interior private space of the 
planned houses would be decided by the MoH, in full compliance with the 
central political approach on approved social behavior and aesthetics. 
Architectural, Aesthetic, Social and Cultural Issues
If speed and efficiency were key concerns, could they be combined with high-
end architecture and aesthetics? And if yes, could a non-standard design suc-
cessfully express the social and cultural conditions demanded by the Saudi 
state and the end-users of the projected developments? After all, who will the 
users be? This project lacked the most important of feasibility pre-studies: 
a social study concerning the end-user, and the pursued social context, one 
that would support the double transition from a nomadic life to a permanent 
settlement and from a rural life to an emergent Saudi bourgeoisie; one that 
would provide and potentially differentiate the true needs of the communi-
ties in terms of locality; and would adjust to specific, customized properties 
of age, employment, culture, and climate. Such a study was never part of the 
big picture, either due to the urgency of the project or purposely in order to 
promote a uniform, nationwide urban identity that would serve the politi-
cal agenda of the state. Could this imply that the individual receiving such a 
‘modern villa’ would happily denounce his/her own voice, will, and prefer-
ences? Originally yes, since this was one of the major master plan objectives: 
“to have equal plots with equal accessibility in order to promote a sense of a 
compact community and justice in the eyes of God and the Government.”17 
So, even when local authorities pushed the MoH for faster and more palpable 
results (to satisfy the public) and MoH decided to abolish the villa design 
and concentrate on the design/implementation of the infrastructure, locality 
principles didn’t apply. Thus, little concern was given to such parameters as 
local culture and way of life, communal activities and public space, climate 
and so on.
Another particularity was that the lack of standards (in all disciplines 
involved) was often replaced by the introduction of negative standards, or 
things to be avoided, directly by the MoH officials to the designers. Most of 
those standards concerned the road network, though their implications would 
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extend to the overall urban morphology produced. The most glaring example 
was the order to avoid designing crossroad junctions. To the designers’ sur-
prise, the reason for that directive was not related to driving safety concerns 
addressing the higher accident risk the crossroads would imply. Instead, a 
religious symbolic perspective was presented, solely based on the bird’s eye 
(“Google Earth”) view of the development. This was indicative of the central 
state’s strong intention to forge a superficial, uniform behavioral pattern for 
its civilians by tampering with and reproducing urban design stereotypes as a 
means of social manipulation. 
Master Planning
All the aforementioned issues were constantly stalling, if not discarding, 
the main project’s time schedule, creating vicious circles of communication 
Figure 3. From mild and organic urbanism to cultural cacophonies. 
Source: Apostolos Kyriazis archive and Saudi Ministry of Tourism  
and Antiquities – top right).
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between the planners and the supervising bodies. Nevertheless, the Ministry 
founded the master plans on ‘moving sand’ and enclosed its end-users in yet 
another real estate dead end. The stereotypes used seriously challenged the 
project’s future sustainability since it had not been grounded on a clear under-
standing of the relative context at hand.
Concept Formalism and Zoning
Provided that all analysis studies were submitted and approved in compliance 
with regulations, the concept stage was to be designed and submitted for each 
site. One concept alone would be selected to proceed to full design. Hence, the 
road network, residential plots, community facilities, and public spaces would 
have to be displayed in a freehand way of minimum information displayed 
and main statistics estimated. However, the MoH definition of a concept was 
limited to a “Google Earth” perspective, disregarding the natural context, 
topography, orientation, views, and all sustainability factors addressed at the 
urban scale. Formalism was unavoidable, with symmetrical approaches being 
favored.
Zoning was also on the MoH desirables list, since its clarity would guaran-
tee equality amongst all villa owners and better control of the public spaces. 
The main utility stations would fit at the corners of the plots, neglecting the 
topography (at a point that “the water tower can stay at the lowest point, we 
can afford more pumps”) and disregarding any neighboring development/
land use, pedestrian passages, or existing mixed-use areas.
Urban Sprawl, Urban Stereotypes and Social Inertia
Was the infliction of the abovementioned housing stereotypes unavoidable? 
The absence of options in plot dimensions and housing typologies and the 
unexplained perseverance of the “Western” villa typology,18 combined with 
the prohibition of crossroads (for symbolic reasons), together with other 
technical issues, resulted in a seamless, uniform, monotonous urban mor-
phology, barren of density fluctuations. Priority was given to unobstructed 
Figure 4. MoH Project site: Bisha. A symmetric vision, completely isolated 
from its urban context.
10 ARCHITECTURE_MEDIA_POLITICS_SOCIETY  Vol. 13 No. 3  April 2018
Amps
and ubiquitous car circulation, whereas free pedestrian movement and 
‘walkability’ were both unexplored and obsolete at the same time. This new 
urban sprawl would provide the easy way against all urban design and plan-
ning values regarding adherence to local traditions and sustainability.19 As 
Constantinos Doxiadis had stated five decades previously, the city of the 
present must express the synthesis of the human and the mechanic scale of the 
automobile, the latter being the greatest challenge to the continuity of human 
settlements.20
Across the limited literature concerning housing in Saudi Arabia, there 
are few reports on the true reasons for the benchmarking transitions reshap-
ing the region: from the local vernacular courtyard house to the Western 
villa with permanently curtained windows,21 from the organic volumetric 
arrangements and the windy sikkak to rectangular plots of 6m high walls,22 
or from the bustling souqs to indifferent, geometrically perfect but soulless 
public spaces.23 The adoption of the villa, in particular, conveys a stereotype 
experienced in the USA during the similar car and consumption boom in the 
sixties, detached however from all “sleeping cities” criticism and seemingly 
unable to go through similar social conquests ever since. The superficiality of 
the use of imported stereotypes reveals a diverse society in transition and its 
high inertia. But, despite the fact that the sustainability scene globally argues 
for solutions based on locality and tradition,24 the Saudi state somehow relies 
on a state of apathy and negation in an effort to ensure its political stability. 
Ineffective Renegotiation
Even if most of the bottlenecks of the project were explained orally to the 
Ministry officials, there was no mechanism established to tackle them. 
Administrative issues were partially resolved through individual efforts and 
personal contact and endeavor. However, technical and architectural obsta-
cles were too fundamental to bypass, and, at the same time, they had already 
been embodied in the local system of urban governance and social relations.
Since the first major inefficiency indicators were visible, the Saudi govern-
ment has made several convulsive attempts to modify things: The Ministry 
hired (2013) one of the four original companies for consultation regarding 
design approvals without, however, unifying design standards or proposing 
a system for their regular revision.25 Also, the Minister’s position, a highly 
political choice made by the royal family, has been reassigned twice since 
MoH founding.26 Nevertheless, these gestures only targeted the program’s 
efficiency rather than its qualitative parameters.
The pressure on the supply side for middle- and low-class housing remains 
unaddressed. As shown in a recent report published by Bloomberg, since the 
oil boom the Saudi state has hinged on supporting the real estate monopolies 
through irrational urban growth strategies and on sustaining extreme levels 
of social segregation.27 After fueling the land market speculation and being 
threatened by a potential fiscal and social collapse, the Saudi government 
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recently decided on an unprecedented wave of subsidies’ cuts, including an 
“undeveloped urban land tax.”28 The details of this late effort are still undis-
closed; however, it is quite doubtful that the real estate oligarchies will even-
tually indemnify and redeem themselves for decades of exploitation, or that 
the commercial prices will become low enough for a wider social spectrum to 
afford. 
Concluding Remarks
Fear of the expansion of the Arab Spring uprising to the Saudi Kingdom in 
2011, triggered the founding of a special Ministry of Housing and the launch 
of a remarkable public housing program countrywide. This political tactic 
was not strategically matched by a parallel concern regarding chronic high 
unemployment rates, extreme social segregation, and scanty housing. The 
overall sketchiness of this endeavor belies the compromised intentions of the 
project. Administrative conflicts, cultural side-effects, and technical inad-
equacies were constantly in the picture. The government relied on forwarding 
specific urban stereotypes by the introduction of obsolete standards. The 
proposed urban morphology, barren of any social, economic, and environ-
mental sustainability factors – vital for such a demanding environment – and 
of any architectural and urban design elements of cultural significance and 
continuity, only served the central state’s purposes to individualize, flatten, 
and control communities, and to depoliticize the public agenda.29 
Apart from the project’s failure, it is proven that a publicly funded social 
housing program may succeed only by actively engaging the end-users in the 
process and by providing a speculation-free environment for all key players.30 
Furthermore, when sustainability is the question in such demanding environ-
ments, locality and tradition can be the answer. 
Unfortunately, this project was founded on sand – easily stirred by the 
wind. The endogenous reaction to any change has proven too strong to 
intercept. Concerning the latter, this was an intentional choice. This echoing 
failure, however, must become a valuable stepping stone to the introduction 
of more civic rights and social participation in large-scale projects. 
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